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SECURITIES-RESALE BY DEVELOPER OF LAND PURCHASER'S CONTRACTS IS INVESTMENT CONTRACT AND MUST BE REGISTERED-SEC
MAY NOT BE COMPELLED TO COMMENT UPON REGISTRATION STATE-

MENTS-SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
(D. Minn. 1972)

93,348

In the latter part of 1969 Lake Havasu Estates, a corporation, undertook a nationwide campaign to sell investors the purchase money pledges
it held under land sales installment contracts.1 Within two years
this marketing device garnered approximately $3,500,000 in publicly invested monies. During this time the corporation was informed
on several occasions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
that the particular contract it offered the public constituted a security
and was subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of
1933.2 Finally, in July of 1971 Lake Havasu filed a Form S-1 Registration Statement covering an offering of its contracts. The registration statement, as twice amended, never became effective. The SEC
filed a complaint and sought injunctive relief against Lake Havasu for
offering and selling unregistered securities. The corporation entered a
general denial that it had violated the registration provisions of the Securities Act and counterclaimed, alleging that it had attempted to
1. Lake Havasu Estates is an Arizona corporation whose principal place of business
is in that state. The corporation is engaged in the acquisition, development and sale
of land. The land is sold primarily on an installment contract basis to the land purchaser who signs an Agreement for Deed (Agreement) and a Purchase Money Note
(Note). Title to the land is retained by Lake Havasu until the principal and interest
due under the Note are paid; the land purchaser is then conveyed title in fee simple.
Subsequent to each sale, the purchaser is contacted by Lake Havasu to confirm his intention to fulfill his contract obligation, but no credit investigation is ever undertaken.
As a financing device, Lake Havasu both offers and sells the Agreement and Note
to public investors at a price equal to the unpaid balance of the Note. To promote
these resale activities Lake Havasu employs instruments of transportation and communication in interstate commerce and the mails. The corporation also selects the particular Note to be sold to any investor, serves without charge as the investor's collection agent and agrees to notify the investor promptly of any material default by the
investor. Whenever the land purchaser's installment payment on the Note is late or in
default, the corporation uses its own funds to pay the investor so as not to cause an
interruption in the investor's monthly payments. If a payment is delinquent for 60
days, Lake Havasu must redeliver to the investor another contract having a comparable unpaid balance and rate of return, and accept a re-assignment of the initial contract. Selection of the replacement contract (which has the same commitments, undertakings and guarantees as the defaulted contract) is made by Lake Havasu alone.
2. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1970).
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comply with the provisions of the Act but had been thwarted by members of the Commission. The counterclaim sought an order compelling
the SEC to "comment upon, process and approve" the corporation's
registration statement. Moreover, Lake Havasu filed interrogatories
seeking information about: (1) the facts which caused the Commission to believe that the registration provisions of the Securities were
being violated, (2) what deficiencies, if any, existed in the corporation's registration statement, and (3) the normal practices of the SEC
staff in processing these statements. The Commission moved to dismiss the counterclaim for failing to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted and also objected to the interrogatories propounded
by Lake Havasu on relevancy grounds. The district court granted
the SEC's motion for a preliminary injunction, dismissed the corporation's counterclaim, and refused to compel the Commission to
answer Lake Havasu's interrogatories. 3
The note offered by Lake Havasu to prospective investors was held
by the court to be an "investment contract" and therefore a "security"
under section 2(1) of the Securities Act. 4 The test, as stated in SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co.,5 for ascertaining the existence of an investment
contract is "whether the scheme involves an investment of money in a
common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others."86 The legal terminology involved in the contract is not controlling but the totality of circumstances is. 7 In the instant case the court
took note of the activities of Lake Havasu in selecting the land, the
land purchaser and the specific contract to be sold the investor, in
guaranteeing monthly payments and replacement of land purchase
agreements upon default, and in providing collection agent services
and arrangements for transfers and recording.8 This conduct was
deemed sufficient to make Lake Havasu's offering an "investment contract" within the statutory definition of a security since the investors'
economic welfare hinged upon the continuing ability of the corporation
to make good its commitments.9
3.CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,348, at 91,885.
4.Id.at 91,879. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
5. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
6.Id.at 301.
7. Id.; SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S.344 (1943).
8. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 193,348, at 91,878.
9. SEC V. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. at 348 (1943); Los Angeles Trust Deed
& Mortgage Exchange v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
919 (1961).
The transactions in Los Angeles Trust Deed, which were held to involve the issu-
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Lake Havasu argued unsuccessfully that its offering was not a security since (1) the note sold to investors stemmed from a land sales transaction which was subject to regulation by the Department of Housing
under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act,"0 and (2) the contract offered the investor was for a fixed rate of return and in no way
was dependent upon the profitability of the corporation's ventures.1 1
The Court made quick dispatch of these contentions. 2 Moreover, it
should have been clear from the outset that under SEC Securities Act
Release No. 3892 the corporation's offering constituted a security.' 3
ance of a security, dealt with the purchase of trust deed notes by a company using
funds furnished it by investors. The investors, having been led to expect ten percent
earnings, placed their reliance in the continuing ability of the company to act as
collection agent and to arrange the repurchase or foreclosure of the notes when
necessary. Lake Havasu attempted to distinguish their situation from that of the
Los Angeles Trust Deed case in at least two particulars. Lake Havasu asserted that
the situations were dissimilar since (1) Lake Havasu did not reinvest investor's
earnings in new notes, and (2) they did not obtain funds from investors prior to purchasing trust deeds. The court felt that these were distinctions without a difference.
10. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 93,348, at 91,880. In answer to Lake Havasu's
argument the court stated that the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act
(15 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. (1970) ) was directed towards the protection of the land
buyer and not the subsequent note purchaser. Furthermore, the court failed to see
what bearing the existence of this regulation could have on a company registering its
securities under the 1933 Act. Although the court did not indicate whether Lake
Havasu had in fact filed under the Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, it would seem that
the similarity between the two acts might have prompted Lake Havasu's contention
that the Land Sales Full Disclosure Act preempted the Securities Act. This question remains unanswered. But the court intimated that the two agencies have concurrent jurisdiction. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 193,348, at 91,880. However, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1702(a)(5) exempts from the Land Sales Full Disclosure Act the "sale of evidences
of indebtedness secured by a mortgage or deed of trust." See generally Ellis, Land
Sales Full Disclosure Laws: Federal & Illinois, 60 ILL. B.J. 16 (1971); Krechter,
Federal Regulation of Real Estate Sales, 7 LAw Noms 85 (1971).
93,348, at 91,880. The court, in rejecting Lake
11. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
Havasu's contention, observed that "the probability that an investor will receive that
rate of return and recover his principal is clearly dependent upon the success or
failure of Lake Havasu's operations." The court noted that in the Los Angeles
Trust Deed case (285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961);
see note 9 supra), there was also a fixed rate of return.
12. See notes 10 and 11 supra.
13. SEC Securities Act Release No. 3892 (January 31, 1958). In this release the
Commission presented its opinion of what constitutes an "investment contract" within
the meaning of section 2(1) of the 1933 Act. The Release enumerated these common
services often offered in conjunction with the sale of trust deeds:
(a) Complete investigation and placing service.
(b) Servicing collection, payments, foreclosure, etc.
(c) Implied or express guarantee against loss at any time or providing a
market for the underlying security.
(d) Making advances of funds to protect the security of the investment.
(e) Acceptance of small uniform or continuous investments.
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A nagging question which remains is what recourse does one have
when the Commission demands registration of an issue which is arguably not a security. 4 In Lake Havasu's case, where there were prior
sales of the issue, the best strategy, and one followed by the defendant
corporation, would be to register as a precautionary move, but refuse
to admit that any of the prior sales were of securities.15 Yet even
when this is done the registrant finds himself in a conundrum. If
the Commission drags its feet in processing the registration statement,
the registrant may, due to financial problems,' 6 decide the risk of civil
and criminal sanctions appended to the issuance of a false registration
statement is one worth taking. 1 7 The other alternative, as the court
glibly points out, is for the registrant to make the registration statement
(f)
Implied or actual guarantee of specified yield or return.
(g)
Continual reinvestment of funds.
(h) Payment of interest prior to actual purchase of the mortgage or trust
note.
Providing for fractional interests in mortgages or deeds of trust.
(i)
(j)
Circumstances which necessitate complete reliance upon the seller, e.g.,
great distance between mortgaged property and investor.
(k) Seller's selection of the mortgage or deed of trust for the investor.
The SEC concluded in the Release that "[t]he wider the range of services offered
and the more the investor must rely on the promoter or third party, the clearer it
becomes that there is an investment contract." The Commission also stated that the
fact "that the purchaser looks solely to his own mortgage or deed of trust for income or
profits will [not] obviate the requirements for registration."
14. The determination of what constitutes a "security" has become a thorny problem
with the advent of new marketing devices which cannot easily be categorized as securities but which nevertheless have been so designated by the Commission. One example of how broad the definition of security has become is seen in the SEC's reply
to a request for a no-action letter from Investment Diamonds, Inc. concerning a
business arrangement whereby diamonds were sold to the public with a five year option. The option granted the purchaser the choice of reselling the gem to the company at the purchase price or returning the diamond and receiving credit on the
purchase of a more valuable gem. The credit was based on the purchase price plus an
annual 5% "trade-in increase." The SEC rejected the corporation's assertion that the
transaction did not involve a security, despite the diamond's inherent value, and opined
that purchasers would be financially compelled to exercise their repurchase rights and
would therefore be dependent upon the efforts of the corporation. Investment Dia78,350, at 80,806 (1971).
monds, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
The problem is further complicated by the difficulties one encounters in selecting
the appropriate registration form. It has been urged that any extensions in the definition of a security should be promulgated by Congress and not by ad hoc decisions
of the Commission. Shipley, The SEC's Expanding Definition of a Security, 37
N.Y.BJ. 521 (1965).
15. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,348, at 91,877.
16. Lake Havasu presented evidence indicating that suspension of its note sales
(the source of the corporation's capital and object of the SEC's requested injunction)
would put Lake Havasu out of business within 30 to 60 days.
17. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12, 17, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77q (1970).
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effective by withdrawing his "delaying amendment.' 1 8 Of course, in
this event the SEC would suspend the effectiveness of the registration
statement by issuing a "stop order" under section 8(d) of the Securities
Act. 19 Although this section makes provision for a hearing 0 which is
then reviewable by a federal court,2 these proceedings should not,
contrary to the court's suggestion, determine whether the challenged

issue is a security.
The stop order hearing required under section 8(d) is limited to ascertaining if "the registration statement includes any untrue state-

ment of a material fact or omits to state any material fact required
to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading.
..."22 Clearly, then, the stop order hearing is not designed to decide the ultimate question of whether the registration statement involves a "security." It would seem that there should be some

statutory recourse, short of a stop order proceeding, available to a reg18. Securities Act of 1933 § 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1970) provides: "Except as
hereinafter provided, the effective date of a registration statement shall be the twentieth
day after the filing thereof. . . ." Although the statute authorizes a 20-day waiting
period between the filing of the registration statement and the date it becomes effective, this is not the usual occurrence since a "delaying amendment" is typically filed.
Material to the issuance of a security is a determination of its price. It is crucial to the
distribution, due to possible market fluctuations during the 20 days, that the price
amendment be disclosed immediately before the registration statement becomes effective. For this reason, and in order to facilitate SEC review of the statement, the
delaying amendment has been authorized by the Commission. 17 C.F.R. § 230.473
(1971). Through this device the registrant waives the 20-day period. When the
SEC informally approves the registration statement the underwriter and issuer submit
the price amendment and through a procedure known as "acceleration," the registration
statement becomes effective immediately. Section 8(a) of the Securities Act gives the
Commission authority to waive the 20-day waiting period.
19. Securities Act of 1933 § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1970) reads:
If it appears to the Commission at any time that the registration statement
includes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading, the Commission may, after notice by personal service or the sending of confirmed telegraphic notice, and after opportunity for hearing (at a time
fixed by the Commission) within fifteen days after such notice by personal
service or the sending of such telegraphic notice, issue a stop order suspending the
effectiveness of the registration statement.
20. Id. See 17 C.F.R. § 201 (1971).
21. Securities Act of 1933 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 77i (1970) provides:
Any person aggrieved by an order of the Commission may obtain review of
such order in the Court of Appeals of the United States, within any circuit
wherein such person resides or has his principal place of business, or in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such
court, within sixty days after the entry of such order, a written petition praying
that the order of the Commission be modified or be set aside in whole or in part.
22. Securities Act of 1933 § 8(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1970).
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This is

particularly true when the registrant has applied for but been denied
24
a "no-action" letter.
The opinion in SEC v. Lake Havasu Estates may be cited as precedent for the proposition that the SEC may postpone the registration
process even when it has not provided responsive information to a registrant whose statement is on file. The court stated:
While the commission's staff offers informal advisory service to registrants and others to aid them in attempting to comply with applicable legal standards, it does not follow .that any person is entitled to
compel the staff to issue comments upon a registrationstatement.25

The determination of the court in Lake Havasu that a member of
the Commission's staff cannot be mandated to exercise his discretionary
function is grounded in the Administrative Procedure Act.20 Under
section 701(a) of Title 5 of the United States Code, the discretionary
functions of an agency are not judicially reviewable.2 7 Only a final
agency action, such as a stop order proceeding which tends to produce
23. There are certain circumstances under which the registrant should think twice
about fomenting a stop order proceeding. For example, where the Commission has
announced in advance its determination, the hearing could prove psychologically as
well as economically damaging to the registrant's business operations. The Commission's action in pinpointing the deficiencies in a registration statement, however, does
not show one how to rectify them. It may also be, especially in the area of land sales
and pooling agreements, that no suitable registration form has been promulgated by the
SEC.
24. A "no-action" letter is an affirmative response by the SEC staff to a request
by a petitioner that no action will be recommended to the Commission in dealing with
his particular set of circumstances. See Lowenfels, SEC "No-Action" Letters: Some

Problems & Suggested Approaches, 71 COLUM. L. Rv. 1256 (1971).
25. CCH FED. SEC. L. RE'. %93,348, at 91,884 (emphasis added).
26. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970).
27. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970):
This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent
that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed
to agency discretion by law.
See Dyer v. SEC, 291 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1961). In Dyer the plaintiff sought to
compel the SEC to investigate matters he deemed relevant to the SEC's review of a
proxy statement. The court denied plaintiff's request stating that in this area the
Commission had been given "absolute discretion as to exercise and exclusive judgment
as to field and scope. . . . What is involved is wholly internal administrative power
and function, which the courts have no jurisdiction to compel the exercise of."
Id. at 781. See also Leighton v. SEC, 221 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 825 (1956) (although an action of the SEC in declining to entertain a request to investigate and regulate the issuance and sale of travelers checks constituted a
final order of the Commission, it was discretionary and hence unreviewable).
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a legal wrong, is reviewable under the Act. 28

In the instant case the

court denominated as discretionary the need for the SEC to comment
upon a registration statement.2 9 Therefore a registrant, perhaps one in-

terested in determining whether his proposed issuance is a security,
must cause the SEC to take affirmative action, i.e., a stop order or injunctive proceeding, before he can obtain judicial review. As was ear-

lier noted, the review entailed in such a proceeding might not assist
the registrant seeking knowledge of the nature of his offering.3 0
The court did not announce under what authority the SEC has the

power to defer review of a registration statement and thereby refuse
to register it, and the Securities Act itself does not grant the Commis-

sion such power under the guise of disclosure.3 1 Earlier cases involving the Commission's responsibility for providing responsive comments

on registration statements are distinguishable from the court's approach
in Lake Havasu. These decisions had precluded a registrant from
compelling the SEC to comment upon his registration statement when

the statement was materially deficient for purposes of disclosure. 2
Whether such comment could be compelled when the statement was

less deficient than this has not been decided. Moreover, in prior cases
where the Commission argued that the registration statement was
grossly defective, the court invariably examined and discussed the par28. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(c), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970). See also Securities Act of 1933 § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 77(i) (1970).
29. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,348, at 91,884. See generally note 35 and accompanying text infra.
30. See note 23 supra.
31. Securities Act of 1933 § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1970).
17 C.F.R. § 202.3
(1971) does not authorize deferred review without comment either. The section reads
in part:
This informal procedure (notice of deficiency by letter) is not generally employed where the deficiencies appear to stem from careless disregard of the statutes and rules or a deliberate attempt to conceal or mislead or where the Commission deems formal proceedings necessary in the public interest.
Section 202.3 gives no hint about what particular procedure will be followed. Cf.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 4934 (November 21, 1968) which reports that the
Commission's policy for handling registration statements which are poorly prepared or
contain material misrepresentations is to issue no oral or written comment. The
statutory basis underlying the establishment of this policy is not clear. See note 41
inf ra.
32. See, e.g., Boruski v. Division of Corp. Finance of U.S. Sec. & Ex. Comm'n,
321 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Boruski sought to compel SEC approval of his
registration statements. The district court examined the documents in question and
held that the SEC was justified in its position that parts of the registration statement
were "incomprehensible." "With the registration statements so palpably deficient, the
Commission was not required to comment upon and specify their shortcomings."

Id. at 1276.
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ticulars in which the statement was defective.3 3 In Lake Havasu the
court accepted without question the assertion of the SEC that the registration statement was faulty. 34 Additionally, the court concluded by
implication that a registrant may not force the Commission staff to issue comment upon his statement even if its defects are minor ones.38
The non-reviewability conclusion reached by the court in Lake Havasu is difficult to reconcile with the decision rendered in Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC.36 The latter case arose under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 193417 and involved a petition to review the refusal of the SEC to compel the inclusion in a proxy statement of a resolution which urged the corporation to cease manufacturing
napalm. There, the court concluded that a no-action letter, despite
its discretionary nature, was reviewable notwithstanding the absence of
a formal evidentiary hearing by the SEC. The court trenchantly declared:
"[D]iscretion ' can be merely another manifestation of the venerable
bureaucratic technique of exclusion by attrition, of disposing of controversies through calculated non-decisions that will eventually cause
eager supplicants to give up in frustration and stop "bothering" the
agency. 38
A distinction between Lake Havasu and Medical Committee may be
drawn, albeit a tenuous one. In Medical Committee the shareholders
were precluded any review by the SEC's issuance of a no-action letter which indicated that there would be no further administrative
hearing. In Lake Havasu, however, the deficiency letter was merely an
informal expression of the commission's discontent with the registration
statement and the corporation still could exercise the option of withdrawing its delaying amendment and proceeding with registration. Of
course, this would lead to the entirely unsatisfactory forum of a stop
order proceeding, as has already been discussed."9
33. Id.
34. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. l 93,348, at 91,884.
35. Id.
36. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), overruled on grounds of mootness, 92 S. Ct.
577 (1972). The Supreme Court failed to reach the substantive issues in vacating and
dismissing the court of appeals decision. The views of the second circuit concerning
the reviewability of no-action letters thus remain the undisturbed opinion of that
distinguished court and should not be given short shrift in future relevant controversies.
37. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970).
38. 432 F.2d at 674.
39. See text accompanying notes 17-23 supra.
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The Securities Act makes no allowance for the deferred review of
a registration statement by the Commission. 40 Although the practice
of deferred review is well established, the only authority for it is a
self-promulgated SEC ruling released subsequent to the decision in

Lake Havasu.41 It would appear then, that the court in the instant
case could have disallowed deferred review as action taken in excess of

the SEC's statutory jurisdiction. The court declined to do this and instead rendered a decision which can be used as a peg on which to hang
the new SEC release which justifies deferred review. The result

reached is consonant with the continuing viability of the SEC. 42 Recognizing that the preservation of the Commission's energies demands

that it not be forced to challenge unique and exhausting metaphysical
questions, the court prescribed preventive law.
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1970).
41. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5231 (Feb. 3, 1972). In this release the Commission set forth certain review procedures which would be used to reduce the backlog
of registration procedures being processed. Four distinct categories of review were
established and the designation of category was made determinative of the type of
examination a registration statement would receive. Under "deferred review" a registrant is notified that his registration statement is "so poorly prepared" that further
staff time cannot be delegated to curing its defects. The registrant receives no comments regarding problem areas and should the registrant decide to go forward without
amending, the staff will recommend appropriate action to the Commission. n the
"cursory review" procedure the staff makes no written or oral comments but upon
receipt of certain signed declarations by the issuer, accountants, and managing underwriter detailing their awareness of their statutory obligations under the Securities Act,
the staff will recommend that the statement be declared effective. Acceleration,
however, may or may not be granted. In the "summary" and "customary" review
procedures the registrant is sent comments that have arisen from an accounting,
financial and legal review by the SEC's staff. The registration statement is declared effective upon compliance with the staff's recommendations and the receipt of
letters from the issuer, accountant and underwriter, which are similar to those
solicited in the course of a "cursory review."
The categorizing of registration statements is a potential source of abuse of administrative power that could go unchecked by the courts. Should a registrant's statement be classified as deserving of only "deferred review" he is left uninformed as
how to correct its deficiencies. The registrant cannot force the SEC to reveal why
its statement is entitled to no more than "deferred review." The staff's review
procedures are entirely within the discretion of the Commission's Division of Corporate Finance. Therefore, the category of "deferred review" could conceivably be
based upon totally impermissible factors. It might serve as a punitive device to retaliate for some real or imagined offense, to make an example of a certain company
for the benefit of an entire industry, or to invidiously discriminate against a particular
group.
42. A minor issue raised by Lake Havasu was given short shrift by the court in
order to preserve the integrity of the SEC. The court held that the Commission may
not be sued as an entity. CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. f 93,348, at 91,885.

